Putin, mobilisation and the winter war of attrition
Plus, Iranian women lead escalating anti-regime protests
Привет (hello)! I hope you’re doing well. There were quite a few developments surrounding Russia and Ukraine over the past week. So, in this edition, we’re looking at what Russian President Vladimir Putin’s partial military mobilisation means for the war in Ukraine.
We’re also looking at what’s happening in Iran where women are leading a new wave of anti-regime protests, and the latest clashes between two former Soviet states — Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Let’s get started.
This day that year
1932: Ibn Saud, the first ruler of Saudi Arabia, proclaimed the unification of the kingdom following conquests by the House of Saud.
1905: Following months of tensions and concerns of a possible war, Norway and Sweden agreed to peacefully dissolve their personal union (combination of countries having the same monarch).
Putin, mobilisation and the winter war of attrition
Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 21 issued an executive order for partial general mobilisation in Russia amid its invasion of Ukraine. The Russian military’s plan is to send 300,000 citizens who are currently in the reserves to the battlefield. But the citizens being drafted are those who have served in the military before and have the necessary skills and relevant experience. Therefore, not everyone in the 18-60 age group is expected to join the defence forces at the moment, as would have been the case if it was a full mobilisation (which remains a possibility in the future).
Yet, this partial mobilisation is also significant. This is the first time since Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union (during the Second World War) that Russia has ordered such a mobilisation. It’s also significant because Putin has essentially opted to escalate the conflict despite suggestions from leaders of China and India – Moscow’s partners and two of the biggest countries to have not formally condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine so far — to tone it down, and urging him to promptly end the war. “Today’s era is not one for war,” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi told Putin during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit last week. Putin told Modi that he knew India’s position and concerns on the war. “We will do all we can to end that as quickly as possible. Regrettably, the other side, the leadership of Ukraine, has rejected the negotiations process and stated that it wants to achieve its goals by military means, on the battlefield,” Putin said, shifting the blame on Kyiv. Chinese President Xi Jinping had also reportedly expressed “concerns” over the war during his meeting with Putin.
Calling up reservists is also another admission of sorts that things have not gone as per the Kremlin’s initial plan (the United Kingdom’s defence minister Ben Wallace suggests something similar). After all, inducting 300,000 personnel after seven months of fighting wouldn’t have been necessary if Moscow’s objectives in Ukraine had been achieved as planned. Speaking to reporters after the SCO summit in Uzbekistan last week, Putin had reiterated that the “liberation” of Ukraine’s entire eastern Donbas region remained Russia’s main military objective (he had earlier said the goal was to “denazify” Kyiv).
It’s also essential to note that mobilising civilians to fight a war is politically risky. Such a step risks people getting further antagonised against their government — especially when many of them didn’t back the war in the first place. It could be argued that, in Russian public opinion, it’s Putin’s war — not Russia’s. Nor is it a war of defence where you could expect people to set aside their differences with the government and take up arms to help defend their country (though Putin wants people to believe it’s a defensive war). So, this decision calling for partial mobilisation clearly shows how the war in Ukraine has become a matter of desperation, and life and death for Putin’s regime.
Putin is doubling down on the Russian invasion of Ukraine despite facing serious setbacks. The “special military operations”, as Putin calls it, was supposed to last just a few days, but has now gone on for almost seven months. Russia has faced a large number of war casualties, lost a lot of military equipment and is failing to hold on to the significant territorial gains it had made at the beginning of the conflict. Ukraine has also suffered heavy casualties. But its military, backed by western equipment and intelligence, has made rapid advances in eastern Ukraine in recent weeks. With momentum on its side, the Ukrainian leadership is expressing confidence of not only reclaiming territory lost since February 2022, but also taking back areas like Crimea that Russia had “annexed” in 2014. Putin’s announcement came a day after Russian-controlled regions in eastern and southern Ukraine set out plans to hold referendums to officially join Russia (the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk would have moved further towards joining Russia by the time you receive this edition in your inbox; the vote on joining Russia began in some parts on September 23). These regions becoming a part of Russia allows Moscow to see these areas as its sovereign territory (like Crimea) – though they are internationally recognised as part of Ukraine. Any attempt by Ukraine to retake these territories from Russia (considered by Moscow as its own territory) would then be seen by Putin as an attack on Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity — leading to further escalation of the conflict. To this end, Putin also made a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons to defend such areas in Ukraine. Accusing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members of “nuclear blackmail”, Putin said in clear terms: “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff”.
So, what is the significance of adding 300,000 troops to the Russian military? Analysts think this is Putin’s reinforcement ahead of what is expected to be a difficult winter in Ukraine. As history tells us, combat in such a terrain is incredibly difficult during the winter months. Mobilisation could help Russia stall Ukrainian advances during the winter months. Reinforcing its battlefield units would, in theory, help Moscow retain much of the territory it has gained in Ukraine and defend the eastern regions that are expected to be annexed by the Russian Federation, during the winter.
Turmoil within
This partial mobilisation is having an impact within Russia as well. So far, much of the general population in Russia had little direct connection to what was happening on the battlefield. That changes with partial mobilisation and the possibility of a full mobilisation. Russians — especially those who don’t approve of their country’s invasion of Ukraine — are visibly concerned that this could turn into a full-fledged mobilisation in the future. This was evident from the sudden protests Putin’s announcement triggered inside Russia and flights out of the country to destinations like Istanbul and Yerevan (where Russians are allowed to enter without a visa) getting fully booked within moments of the partial mobilisation being ordered. Authorities responded by reportedly forcing airlines to stop selling tickets to Russian men in the 18-60 age bracket (to stop them from fleeing the country). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also urged people in Russia to protest the mobilisation.
Will this mobilisation help Russia? Does it have adequate resources to quickly equip, retrain and support these 300,000 extra personnel in the harsh winter months? Is it too late? The country is believed to be already struggling to replenish its military stock (in the September 8 edition, we had discussed how the shortage of weapons had reportedly forced Russia to buy artillery from North Korea. Now, Pyongyang too, has denied having supplied weapons to Russia).
Additionally, will reservists who weren’t actively involved in combat so far help turn the tide when the Russian military’s own elite forces have failed to meet their objectives in Ukraine? All this points towards one outcome — this is turning into a winter war of attrition.
Read more:
‘Take Putin’s nuclear threat seriously, but not too seriously’ by Hal Brands on Bloomberg
‘A cornered Putin is more dangerous than ever’, by Roger Cohen (originally published in The New York Times)
What else?
Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan clashes
Last week, we talked about the clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan that led to nearly 100 deaths — sparking concerns of a full-fledged conflict between the two rival nations in the South Caucasus. Days later, at least 94 people were killed and about 100 others were injured in clashes along the disputed border between two Central Asian nations — Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Both blamed each other.
Like in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are former Soviet republics which became independent countries in the early 1990s when the Soviet Union was collapsing. The long border between them has witnessed violence regularly amid friction over land and water resources, and roads. There were similar clashes and incidents between them in 2021. However, observers suggest that the region’s dominant power — Russia — currently being tied down in Ukraine has created opportunities for frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus and Central Asia to resume with greater intensity. These nations may be looking to maximise advantage at a time when Russia doesn't have the appetite to intervene. Russia maintains military bases in both countries and are both members of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). There’s also some speculation that the clashes could help Tajik President Emomali Rahmon demonstrate his grip on power and his regime’s stability at a time when he is reportedly planning to transfer his position to his son Rustam.
Under international pressure, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agreed to a protocol on September 20 to end these clashes. The protocol envisions total termination of hostilities, withdrawal of military equipment and troops to their permanent duty stations, joint inspection of border outposts and command posts, and a probe into the clashes. The agreement is currently holding but there’s no guarantee of that happening in the future.
Anti-regime protests in Iran
Women in Iran are leading escalating protests against the regime and its morality police. The demonstrations, involving some publicly burning their hijab, were triggered by the custodial death of a 22-year-old Kurdish woman, Mahsa Amini. She was detained for breaking the country’s strict hijab laws. Police deny that Amini was mistreated and claim that she suffered “sudden heart failure”. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said in New York — where he was attending the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) — that the custodial death will be investigated. But that hasn’t been enough to quell the protests seeking larger reforms. Social media footage shows some protesters chanting “death to the dictator”, lighting garbage cans on fire and fighting the police.
At least 31 people have been killed in the ensuing crackdown on these protests by Iran’s security forces, according to Iran Human Rights — an organisation based outside the country. However, officials deny that security forces killed any of those protesters and have instead blamed “rioters” for the deaths.
According to NetBlocks, which tracks network disruptions and shutdowns, the harshest internet restrictions have been imposed to quell the largest protests since the anti-government demonstrations of November 2019.
United States President Joe Biden also lent support to the protests. While addressing the UNGA this week, he said that he stood “with the brave citizens and the brave women of Iran who … are demonstrating to secure their basic rights”.
Read more on Iran’s hijab law and morality police here
Watch: Iran’s President cancels interview after CNN’s Christiane Amanpour refuses headscarf demand
So, is this the end of the current Iranian regime? Unlikely, Tehran watchers say. It’s important to remember that these kinds of protests aren’t unheard of and the Iranian authorities have massive resources to put an end to such demonstrations — as they have on several occasions in the past. But such protests from time to time do reveal the public opinion inside Iran especially among the young.
Interesting stuff
India’s former national security adviser Shivshankar Menon argues in Foreign Policy that a growing number of countries may opt for “non-alignment” again so as to avoid getting sucked into a great-power competition. Read Menon’s full argument here.
“Rather than attempt to put forward a better alternative, [US President] Biden has apparently opted to chip away at the One China policy and see what happens.” Stephen Wertheim writes for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that 'president' Biden should listen to 'senator' Biden on the Taiwan issue. Read it here.
Milan Vaishnav talks to Chris Clary, a non-resident fellow at Stimson Center, about when and why rival states pursue conflict or cooperation (especially India and Pakistan). Listen to the ‘Grand Tamasha’ podcast episode here.
In the September 8 edition, we were wondering why former Sri Lankan president Gotabaya Rajapaksa had returned to Colombo weeks after having fled amid protests calling for his clan’s ouster from power — as the country faces its worst economic crisis. Sudhi Ranjan Sen and Kai Schultz write in Bloomberg this week that Sri Lankan protesters are sensing a wider plot for President Ranil Wickremesinghe (who took over from Rajapaksa) to restore the clan to power. Remember, the Wickremesinghe administration is supported by lawmakers from the Rajapaksas’ party. Read the piece here.
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